## Journals

- Advances in Mathematics of Communications
- Big Data & Information Analytics
- Communications on Pure & Applied Analysis
- Discrete & Continuous Dynamical Systems - A
- Discrete & Continuous Dynamical Systems - B
- Discrete & Continuous Dynamical Systems - S
- Evolution Equations & Control Theory
- Inverse Problems & Imaging
- Journal of Computational Dynamics
- Journal of Dynamics & Games
- Journal of Geometric Mechanics
- Journal of Industrial & Management Optimization
- Journal of Modern Dynamics
- Kinetic & Related Models
- Mathematical Biosciences & Engineering
- Mathematical Control & Related Fields
- Mathematical Foundations of Computing
- Networks & Heterogeneous Media
- Numerical Algebra, Control & Optimization
- AIMS Mathematics
- Conference Publications
- Electronic Research Announcements
- Mathematics in Engineering

### Open Access Journals

*Advances in Mathematics of Communications*article from 2007 proposes an informal 2-party key establishment along the lines of the classic Diffie-Hellman construction, but using a two-sided matrix semiring action. The article contains no formal security analysis, but a specific parameter choice has been considered. We describe a heuristic attack technique against the suggested instance, which for the published "challenge value" results in a complete session key recovery with only a minor computational effort.

*attribute-based key establishment*. A number of new issues arise in this setting that are not present in the usual settings of group key establishment where unique user identities are assumed to be publicly available.

After detailing the security model, we give a two-round solution in the random oracle model. As main technical tool we introduce a notion of attribute-based signcryption, which may be of independent interest. We show that the type of signcryption needed can be realized through the encrypt-then-sign paradigm. Further, we discuss additional guarantees of the proposed protocol, that can be interpreted in terms of deniability and privacy.

In this paper we focus on protocols for private set intersection (PSI), through which two parties, each holding a set of inputs drawn from a ground set, jointly compute the intersection of their sets. Ideally, no further information than which elements are actually shared is compromised to the other party, yet the input set sizes are often considered as admissible leakage.

In the unconditional setting we evidence that PSI is impossible to realize and that unconditionally secure size-hiding PSI is possible assuming a set-up authority is present in an set up phase. In the computational setting we give a generic construction using smooth projective hash functions for languages derived from perfectly-binding commitments. Further, we give two size-hiding constructions: the first one is theoretical and evidences the equivalence between PSI, oblivious transfer and the secure computation of the AND function. The second one is a twist on the oblivious polynomial evaluation construction of Freedman et al. from EUROCRYPT 2004. We further sketch a generalization of the latter using algebraic-geometric techniques. Finally, assuming again there is a set-up authority (yet not necessarily trusted) we present very simple and efficient constructions that only hide the size of the client's set.

## Year of publication

## Related Authors

## Related Keywords

[Back to Top]