Cryptanalysis of a 2-party key establishment based on a semigroup action problem
Rainer Steinwandt Adriana Suárez Corona
Advances in Mathematics of Communications 2011, 5(1): 87-92 doi: 10.3934/amc.2011.5.87
An Advances in Mathematics of Communications article from 2007 proposes an informal 2-party key establishment along the lines of the classic Diffie-Hellman construction, but using a two-sided matrix semiring action. The article contains no formal security analysis, but a specific parameter choice has been considered. We describe a heuristic attack technique against the suggested instance, which for the published "challenge value" results in a complete session key recovery with only a minor computational effort.
keywords: semigroup action problem key establishment Cryptanalysis semiring.
Attribute-based group key establishment
Rainer Steinwandt Adriana Suárez Corona
Advances in Mathematics of Communications 2010, 4(3): 381-398 doi: 10.3934/amc.2010.4.381
Motivated by the problem of establishing a session key among parties based on the possession of certain credentials only, we discuss a notion of attribute-based key establishment. A number of new issues arise in this setting that are not present in the usual settings of group key establishment where unique user identities are assumed to be publicly available.
    After detailing the security model, we give a two-round solution in the random oracle model. As main technical tool we introduce a notion of attribute-based signcryption, which may be of independent interest. We show that the type of signcryption needed can be realized through the encrypt-then-sign paradigm. Further, we discuss additional guarantees of the proposed protocol, that can be interpreted in terms of deniability and privacy.
keywords: signcryption. attribute-based cryptography Group key establishment
Private set intersection: New generic constructions and feasibility results
Paolo D'Arco María Isabel González Vasco Angel L. Pérez del Pozo Claudio Soriente Rainer Steinwandt
Advances in Mathematics of Communications 2017, 11(3): 481-502 doi: 10.3934/amc.2017040

In this paper we focus on protocols for private set intersection (PSI), through which two parties, each holding a set of inputs drawn from a ground set, jointly compute the intersection of their sets. Ideally, no further information than which elements are actually shared is compromised to the other party, yet the input set sizes are often considered as admissible leakage.

In the unconditional setting we evidence that PSI is impossible to realize and that unconditionally secure size-hiding PSI is possible assuming a set-up authority is present in an set up phase. In the computational setting we give a generic construction using smooth projective hash functions for languages derived from perfectly-binding commitments. Further, we give two size-hiding constructions: the first one is theoretical and evidences the equivalence between PSI, oblivious transfer and the secure computation of the AND function. The second one is a twist on the oblivious polynomial evaluation construction of Freedman et al. from EUROCRYPT 2004. We further sketch a generalization of the latter using algebraic-geometric techniques. Finally, assuming again there is a set-up authority (yet not necessarily trusted) we present very simple and efficient constructions that only hide the size of the client's set.

keywords: Private set intersection size-hiding unconditional security homomorphic encryption oblivious pseudorandom evaluation

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