Journal of Dynamics and Games: latest papers
http://www.aimsciences.org/test_aims/journals/rss.jsp?journalID=26
Latest articles for selected journalhttp://www.aimsciences.org/test_aims/journals/displayPaper.jsp?paperID=13325
On repeated games with imperfect public monitoring: From discrete to continuous time
http://www.aimsciences.org/test_aims/journals/displayPaper.jsp?paperID=13325
Mathias Staudigl and Jan-Henrik StegSun, 1 Jan 2017 08:00:00 GMThttp://www.aimsciences.org/test_aims/journals/displayPaper.jsp?paperID=13452
Global analysis of solutions on
the Cournot-Theocharis duopoly with variable marginal costs
http://www.aimsciences.org/test_aims/journals/displayPaper.jsp?paperID=13452
Iraklis Kollias, Elias Camouzis and John LeventidesSun, 1 Jan 2017 08:00:00 GMThttp://www.aimsciences.org/test_aims/journals/displayPaper.jsp?paperID=13542
Price of anarchy for graph coloring games with concave payoff
http://www.aimsciences.org/test_aims/journals/displayPaper.jsp?paperID=13542
In our generalization, payoff is computed
by determining the distance of the player's color
to the color of each neighbor,
applying a concave function $f$ to each distance,
and then summing up the resulting values.
This is motivated, e.g., by spectrum sharing,
and includes the payoff functions suggested by Kun et al. (2013) for future work as special cases.
Denote $f^*$ the maximum value that $f$ attains on {${0,\ldots,k-1}$}.
We prove an upper bound of $2$ on the price of anarchy if $f$
is non-decreasing or assumes $f^*$ somewhere in {${0,\ldots,⌊\frac{k}{2}⌋}$}.
Matching lower bounds are given for the monotone case and if $f^*$ is assumed in $\frac{k}{2}$ for even $k$.
For general concave $f$, we prove an upper bound of $3$.
We use a new technique that works by an appropriate splitting $\lambda = \lambda_1 + \cdots + \lambda_k$
of the bound $\lambda$ we are proving.
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Lasse Kliemann, Elmira Shirazi Sheykhdarabadi and Anand SrivastavSun, 1 Jan 2017 08:00:00 GMThttp://www.aimsciences.org/test_aims/journals/displayPaper.jsp?paperID=13543
Control systems of interacting objects modeled as a game against nature under
a mean field approach
http://www.aimsciences.org/test_aims/journals/displayPaper.jsp?paperID=13543
game against nature according to the mean field
theory; that is, we introduce a game model associated to the proportions of
the objects in each class, whereas the values of the unknown parameter are now
considered as "actions" selected by an opponent to the
controller (the nature). Then, letting $N\rightarrow\infty$ (the mean field
limit) and considering a discounted optimality criterion, the objective for
the controller is to minimize the maximum cost, where the maximum is taken
over all possible strategies of the nature.
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Carmen G. Higuera-Chan, Héctor Jasso-Fuentes and J. Adolfo Minjárez-SosaSun, 1 Jan 2017 08:00:00 GMThttp://www.aimsciences.org/test_aims/journals/displayPaper.jsp?paperID=13544
Discretized best-response dynamics for the rock-paper-scissors game
http://www.aimsciences.org/test_aims/journals/displayPaper.jsp?paperID=13544
Peter Bednarik and Josef HofbauerSun, 1 Jan 2017 08:00:00 GMT