Tail probabilities for triangular arrays
Pages: 45 - 56,
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Drew Fudenberg - Department of Economics, Harvard University, Littauer Center, 1805 Cambridge Street, Cambridge, MA 02138, United States (email)
David K. Levine - Department of Economics, Washington University in St. Louis, 1 Brookings Dr., St. Louis MO 63130-4899, United States (email)
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