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Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization (JIMO)
 

A cooperative game with envy
Pages: 2049 - 2066, Issue 4, October 2017

doi:10.3934/jimo.2017031      Abstract        References        Full text (413.2K)           Related Articles

Jiahua Zhang - School of Management, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China (email)
Shu-Cherng Fang - Industrial Engineering and Operations Research, North Carolina State University, Raleigh, NC 27695-7906, United States (email)
Yifan Xu - School of Management, Fudan University, Shanghai 200433, China (email)
Ziteng Wang - Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, Northern Illinois University, DeKalb, IL 60115, United States (email)

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