Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization (JIMO)

An uncertain wage contract model for risk-averse worker under bilateral moral hazard
Pages: 1815 - 1840, Issue 4, October 2017

doi:10.3934/jimo.2017020      Abstract        References        Full text (458.1K)           Related Articles

Xiulan Wang - Institute of Systems Engineering, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China (email)
Yanfei Lan - Institute of Systems Engineering, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China (email)
Wansheng Tang - Institute of Systems Engineering, Tianjin University, Tianjin 300072, China (email)

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