Mathematical Biosciences and Engineering (MBE)

Multiplayer games and HIV transmission via casual encounters
Pages: 359 - 376, Issue 2, April 2017

doi:10.3934/mbe.2017023      Abstract        References        Full text (628.6K)           Related Articles

Stephen Tully - Department of Mathematics & Statistics, University of Guelph, Guelph ON Canada N1G 2W1, Canada (email)
Monica-Gabriela Cojocaru - Department of Mathematics & Statistics, University of Guelph, Guelph ON Canada N1G 2W1, Canada (email)
Chris T. Bauch - Department of Applied Mathematics & Statistics, University of Waterloo, Waterloo ON Canada, Canada (email)

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