`a`
Journal of Industrial and Management Optimization (JIMO)
 

Information sharing in a make-to-stock supply chain

Pages: 1169 - 1189, Volume 10, Issue 4, October 2014      doi:10.3934/jimo.2014.10.1169

 
       Abstract        References        Full Text (459.3K)       Related Articles       

Juliang Zhang - Department of Logistics Management, School of Economics and Management, Beijing Jiaotong University, Beijing, 100044, China (email)
Jian Chen - Department of Management Science and Engineering, School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, Beijing, 100084, China (email)

Abstract: This paper addresses how different coordination mechanisms affect the information sharing behavior in a supply chain. We study information sharing in a make-to-stock supply chain under wholesale contract and revenue sharing contract. Under wholesale contract, we show that information sharing is always beneficial to the supplier and identify the conditions ensuring that information sharing is beneficial to the retailer. Under revenue sharing contract, information sharing is beneficial to the supplier, the retailer and the supply chain. This research indicates that whether sharing the demand information is beneficial depends on the coordination mechanism and parameters.

Keywords:  Supply chain management, information sharing, contract, make-to-stock, game theory.
Mathematics Subject Classification:  Primary: 90B50, 91B06; Secondary: 91A10.

Received: February 2013;      Revised: September 2013;      Available Online: February 2014.

 References